Fighting machines Type 90, Type 90A and Type 90B

Operation of the K-20 in combat units of the Air Force began in August 1959, when the first missile carriers entered the 1006th TBAP in Uzin near Kiev. By the end of the year, the Tu-95K received the 1226th TBAP in Semipalatinsk, and then the 182nd TBAP in Mozdok. February 14, 1963 the first Tu-95KM arrived in Uzin.

The main objectives of the K-20 system were considered the most important military and industrial facilities in the United States. These included air bases and nuclear storage of strategic aviation in the North near the Canadian border, in Texas, California and Louisiana in the south of the country, missile bases and control centers in the central states, a cascade of energy facilities in the Great Lakes, nuclear centers and Texas oil fields (at that time, most of the oil and gas for the American economy gave its own fields), as well as naval bases and ports on the U.S. coast and islands in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. The courses for most of the targets were along the "Chkalov Route" - the shortest way across the pole, or to the west coast of the American continent.

Many objects were at the limit of reach, and crews regularly worked on relocations and actions from advanced airfields in the North, Far East and Arctic, where ice platforms were used (such exercises in YES were held at least twice a year). The flights were refueled, air defense breakthroughs at low altitudes, group and single strikes were mastered. The crews knew the future goals in detail, studied the environment, relief, radar and other landmarks, approaches and launch areas.

Constant combat duty in the YES regiments complicated the laborious preparation of X-20M. It was necessary to fill the rocket with fuel, special liquids, air and nitrogen, to check the systems and test the engine. If the launch was supposed to be tactical, without dropping the rocket, then often did not install a sub-basement keel, which was attached to more than a hundred screws.

The very suspension of the X-20 under the aircraft required a great deal of effort and skill. The trolley from a three-meter height was squeezed under the fuselage, forcing to turn the stirring blades of screws and jewelry "guessing" the keel of the rocket into the opening of the cargo compartment. The trolley "squatted", allowing to win the extra centimeters, but in this position after half an hour landed on the ground irrevocably. More than once during the sunset, the antennas at the top of the keel were demolished, which were protected by a special frame (with it, when "touching" the antenna remained intact, but sometimes the keel itself was crushed). To roll the X-20 required the efforts of at least 15-20 people.

The assigned resource of the X-20 was determined by the storage time, the flight under the carrier and the number of tactical launches. Repair and refinement of missiles were performed by the ARP. In this case, delivery of missiles in repair is often made by the carriers themselves Tu-95K.

Work with nuclear equipment of missiles had a proper place in combat training, but in the regiments was always carried out using special simulators and training and combat products equipped with all the necessary systems, but without a nuclear charge, allowing to practice all operations on the preparation and use of special BC.

When carrying out offsets launches X-20M were equipped with a training BC with a blast charge, which gave a noticeable explosion and "mark" at the point of impact, which allowed to judge the accuracy of the target. During the combat training from January to October 1962 the Tu-95K crews made 19 launches of X-20M, of which 15 were considered successful. By the time the K-20 was adopted into service was a quite effective system. According to the then assessment, the probability of intercepting a cruise missile by air defense fighters did not exceed 0.02 ... 0.05%, and this was confirmed by the students with the launch of the real X-20, passed through the zone of the object of air defense over one of the ranges. Even after its detection, the radar failed to point anti-aircraft missiles and interceptors to a supersonic high-altitude target - in the front hemisphere, those were ineffective, and breathtaking to catch a high-speed missile was not possible.

However, after a few years, the capabilities of the K-20 seemed insufficient. First of all, this was due to the growing level of air defense, saturated with anti-aircraft systems of zonal defense with long range and altitude, as well as supersonic fighters, capable of intercepting aircraft and shells, and the missile carriers themselves on remote borders to 1000-1200 km. The tasks of defeating strategic targets shifted to intercontinental ballistic missiles, which at that time looked like an absolute weapon. In December 1959, the Strategic Missile Forces were formed, where, in accordance with the Order of the USSR Ministry of Defense of December 31, 1959 and the directive of the General Staff of the Air Force of the former 18th, 48th and 50th IA YES were transferred to the missile parts, units and two army departments. As the units of the Strategic Missile Forces were put on combat duty, many tasks of the YES began to be assigned to them.

The regiments with the K-20 system that were in service of the Air Force were increasingly focused on solving tasks at sea - the defeat of naval bases and hunting for AUG. Ensuring their performance, the crews of missile carriers were also involved in conducting intelligence at sea, acting in conjunction with the scouts Tu-95MR. During the operation of the complex it was possible to reduce training time and labor intensiveness. Launches on maritime targets were carried out in the Caspian Sea, where the range with the appropriate telemetry and traceological equipment provided control over the flight of missiles (if necessary, in the case of failure and departure from the trajectory - their explosion). Anything happened - once in 1983, after ten years of operation of the complex, the crew mistake in tactical launch led to an involuntary discharge of the rocket. That went off the suspension with the engine running and, catching up with the plane, hit it in the fuselage. The crew successfully got home on the damaged plane, and the X-20M crashed into the sea, where it was then long and unsuccessfully sought by the Caspian Flotilla sailors.

The reliability of the complex grew as it served, reaching an acceptable level. With the last firing, conducted in 1006 TBAP in 1987, from the launched dozen missiles all worked off routinely, hitting conventional targets at the range. However, it was already a farewell chord - the combat efficiency of the K-20 complex, created in accordance with the requirements of 1954, looked disappointing, and the chances of performing a real combat mission in the conditions of modern air defense, equipped with early detection systems, air points DRLO, the latest SAMs and interceptors (and deck "Tomkata" with missiles "Phoenix" appeared just in response to the threat of Soviet missiles) - completely untenable.

However, with the write-off of the Tu-95K was not in a hurry - for a long time, long-range vehicles with air-based missiles were not fully replaced. The main emphasis was on the development of other components of the nuclear triad, and in the creation of strategic aircraft and missile weapons for them qualitative changes occurred only in the early 80's, when the long-range cruise missiles X-55. Part of the Tu-95KM, having been re-equipped for a more modern complex K-22, remained in service. Continued to be in the Air Force and the former Tu-95K - by the fall of 1990, a dozen and a half of these machines were in Ukrainka, another one remained in Uzin. These aircraft went into disrepair only after the signing of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms START-1 in 1991. Thus, the service life of the K-20 complex in the Air Force was more than 30 years.