LGM-118A intercontinental ballistic missile - MX

In 1972 a special governmental commission was engaged in research of prospects of development of strategic nuclear forces of the USA till the end of 20th century. As a result of its work, the administration of President Nixon gave the task to develop a promising ICBM capable of carrying a dividing head unit with ten combat units. Research work on the development program of a new ICBM began in February 1972, and in April the U.S. Air Force Headquarters gave the new missile a provisional designation MX (Missile eXperimental) and appointed the SAMSO ("Space and Missile Systems Organization") to be responsible for the program. The new missile was to outperform its predecessor ("Minuteman-III") in terms of accuracy, number of combat units (BUs), their effectiveness, area of BW propagation area, resistance to PFCs, and so on. The new missile was designed primarily to destroy highly protected targets - missile silos and protected command bunkers in a preemptive strike. Its high accuracy and payload made it truly effective; the missile's survivability was supposed to be improved by mobile deployment. Aeronautical, ground, rail and other options were considered as mobile basing options (up to 40 different basing options, including the most exotic ones, were considered at different times). For example, in October 1974, an experimental launch of the Minuteman-IB ICBM dropped from the C-5A Galaxy military transport aircraft was conducted. The first stage of the ICBM contained a fuel charge for a seven-second flight. The experiment confirmed the potential for a mobile aviation-based option.

At the beginning of 1976, the MX program moved from conceptual design to prototype production. In July of the same year, the U.S. Congress blocked the allocation of funding for the development of stationary mine and aircraft types of base and proposed to consider other options for placement of the new ICBM. Alternatively, the option of placing the MX ICBM on a platform moving in a specially prepared secure trench and the option of placing the MPS ("Mobile Protective Shelters") system of mobile protected shelters were proposed. According to the MPS concept, 4,600 shelter launch sites were to be established to accommodate 200 ICBMs for horizontal deployment of missiles scattered around a large diameter circumference. The missile was to move covertly from shelter to shelter under random law. The level of shelter protection was to be such that only one shelter could be disabled by one enemy attacking warhead. When the launch signal was received, the shelter's roof moved apart and the missile was launched in an upright position using a system of special jacks. In April-May 1978, Martin Marietta Corporation was selected as the main contractor for the development of the MX ICBM, while Thiokol, Aerojet, Hercules and Rocketdyne corporations were awarded contracts for the development of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd stage and dilution stages, respectively. The combat units were developed by AVCO, the combat unit - by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the full-scale integration of combat equipment was also conducted by AVCO. The inertial control system was developed by Rockwell Autonetics, while the BCVM was developed by Hewlett-Packard. In June 1979, full-scale engineering development of the MX missile with the main type of basing according to the MPS concept began. However, in the course of work it became clear that the chosen type of base required not only large financial expenditures ($ 37 billion), but also a huge amount of alienated land. In October 1981, by decision of President Reagan, the work in this area was curtailed.

Despite this, the missile systems continued to be tested - by the end of 1981, all three marching stages and a dilution stage had been tested on ground stands, and the combat units, the ABM SLCBs and components of the inertial control system had been tested in flights on Minuteman-III ICBMs. In 1973-1986, 14 nuclear explosions were carried out at the testing ground in the state of Nevada under the program of testing of combat units and missile systems for resistance to PFN. In January 1982, for the first time a research "mortar" launch of a missile mock-up was carried out at a special stand at Nevada Test Site.

In November 1982, the missile under development received a new designation - LGM-118A "Peacekeeper". At the same time, work was launched on a new version of the base, the so-called "tight packing" - CSB ("Closely Spaced Basing", aka "Dense Pack"). According to this concept, the construction of super reinforced shafts (designed for overpressure at the shock front of more than 700 kgf/cm2) was supposed to be just 550 metres apart. The idea was to mutually destroy enemy attack warheads and dampen the shock waves of nuclear explosions, which would allow the main part of the SLC to survive and launch it back. However, it quickly became clear that the CSB concept was based on extremely questionable assumptions.

To address the issue of LGM-118A ICBM deployment, a special government commission headed by General Skoucroft was established. The verdict of the commission was released in April 1983, which stated that due to the deactivation of heavy Titan-II ICBMs it was urgently necessary "to demonstrate national will" to deploy 100 LGM-118A "Peacekeeper" ICBMs in the existing mines of missiles "Minuteman-III", as well as to begin the development of light monoblock solid-fuel mobile ICBMs (later called "Midgetman"). This solution allowed for rapid deployment of new ICBMs at relatively low financial costs and was approved by the Reagan Administration. The 400th and 319th Strategic Missile Squadrons of the 90th Strategic Missile Wing, located at F.E. Warren Airbase (Wyoming), were chosen to deploy missiles. This deployment option did not allow the LGM-118A ICBMs with a normal load (10 BB + ABI SLCM) to engage southern Soviet heavy missile groups. In August 1983, the U.S. Secretary of Defense authorized the beginning of work on the deployment of missiles in the 90th strategic missile wing. The first missiles were to begin arriving at the unit in January 1986 and reach the alert status in December of the same year. The readiness of the entire group was to be achieved by December 1989.

It was decided to test the LGM-118A ICBM in two stages, with six launches each. The tests were conducted at the Western Test Site (Vandenberg Air Force Base, California). The first test stage of six launches was carried out in 1983-1984. The launches were carried out from the launch container installed on a special site. In February 1984, began mass production of missiles. The second stage of testing began in 1985 and ended in 1986. The first two launches of the second stage were also conducted from ground PC, the next - from the converted shafts of ICBM "Minuteman-III".

In July 1985, the program was waiting for a new test - the Congress limited the deployment of missiles to 50 copies. Another 50 were to be deployed after the new basing plan, which would ensure increased survivability, was implemented. Thus, it was decided that the missiles in the first phase would be deployed on the basis of only the 400th Strategic Missile Squadron. The first Minuteman-III missiles began to be removed from mines in January 1986. SAC Air Force received the first four missiles for deployment in October 1986.

In December the same year, U.S. President Reagan announced a plan to deploy the remaining 50 missiles. The plan was called "Peacekeeper Rail Garrison" and involved the deployment of 25 railway complexes, each of which was to accommodate 2 missiles LGM-118A.

In December 1986, the U.S. Air Force SAC announced that the first link of 10 LGM-118A missiles had reached the initial operational status. However, the flight tests recorded unsatisfactory performance of the gyrostabilized platform of the missile inertial control system. It was decided to conduct the third stage of testing (also of six launches). The launches were combined with batch tests and started in 1986. Technical problems with the control system were eliminated, but the Electronics Division of Northrop Corporation (which took over Rockwell Autonetics) did not have time to supply an extremely complex system (about 20,000 parts only in a gyrostabilized platform) in sufficient quantities. As a result, by July 1987, up to one third of the 20 missiles in the mines did not have an installed control system. By January 1988 the problems had been solved and all the missiles received the control system; 30 missiles were already on combat duty. 

In February 1987, the Air Force published a list of ten air bases - candidates for the deployment of the system "Peacekeeper Rail Garrison". 350 million dollars were allocated by Congress for the preliminary development of the project. 3 tests were conducted from January to June 1988 with the conclusion of the experimental train to various parts of the U.S. railways. In May 1988, the U.S. Department of Defense authorized the full deployment of this program. In 1987, after five successful launches under the third test program, it was decided to temporarily "slow down" it - for the Air Force was on account of each missile released. In March 1989, the last test launch was carried out and it was announced that the system had reached full operational readiness. In April of the same year, the new President J. Bush senior announced that the number of simultaneously deployed missiles would not exceed 50 - already deployed missiles would be removed from mines and placed on trains. This was a tribute not only to the "warming between East and West", but also to the appearance in service of the USSR's Strategic Missile Forces of the newest missiles - R-36M2 Voevoda, RT-23 UTTH Molodets and RT-2PM Topol - capable of engaging the Peacekeeper ICBMs and ICBMs. In September of the same year, the Air Force SAC began training and operational launches of the new missile, and in November, the Air Force announced air bases selected to house the missile trains - Barksdale, Louisiana, Little Rock, Arkansas, Grand Forks, North Dakota, Dyess, Texas, Wurtsmys, Michigan and Fairchild, Washington. The F.E. Warren base was to become the main technical base for the programme. The first train was supposed to be on combat duty in December 1992. During the development of the combat railway complex (BZHRK) Americans faced a number of technical and organizational problems, but then suddenly they were helped by the Soviet leadership by agreeing to sign in July 1991 the treaty on the reduction of offensive arms START-1, according to which significantly reduced the number of Soviet heavy ICBMs, and already deployed Soviet BZHRKs stopped combat duty on the highways of the country, standing on static duty in the bases. After that, the work on the promising strategic missile systems of the U.S. ("Peacekeeper Rail Garrison" and "Midgetman") sharply slowed down, and in January 1992 both programs were finally closed.

With regard to the development of the American FDLR, the following should be further noted. According to foreign sources, the BZHRK prototype was tested at the U.S. railway range and the Western Missile Range (Vandenberg Air Base, California) until July 1991. The possible appearance of the American BZHRK included: one or two standard locomotives, two launch cars with MX missiles, a car (command post) with combat control and communications equipment, a car of power supply system, two cars for personnel and support cars. The mass dimensions of the missile made it possible to develop a launch wagon adapted to the US railroad network. It was almost 30 m long and weighed about 180 tons. The container with the rocket was lifted to the launch position by a special lifting mechanism. In order to reduce the load on the rails the launch wagon had eight wheel sets. Shock and vibration loads were reduced due to air and spring shock absorbers. In a separate section the checking and starting equipment was placed. There was also equipment of different technical systems in the combat control and communication car. The locomotives were operated by civilian train brigades. In peacetime conditions, ELBCs were to be on combat duty at permanent bases, at "one of several thousand" pre-selected sites or to conduct combat patrols. With the transfer of the U.S. Strategic Offensive Force from peacetime to wartime, it was planned to rapidly dispense complexes over a large area. After receiving orders to launch missiles, BLWCs would proceed to the nearest parking lot, where ICBMs were being prepared for pre-launch and launched. According to the results of the tests, the U.S. military leadership planned to put on combat duty up to 25 ERBMs with two "MX" missiles in each. Seven air bases located in different states were considered as permanent deployment points for the complexes. Approximately 110,000 km of the United States railway network could be used for the dispersal of BZHRKs.

In early 1991, the U.S. military and political leadership unexpectedly announced that the comprehensive tests of the BZHRK had been successfully completed. At the same time, however, a set of problems was listed. In particular, it was noted that the relative underdevelopment of the US railway network did not ensure high secrecy and survivability of BZHRK. Attention was drawn to their vulnerability and insufficient physical protection against ground and air attacks by a likely enemy, sabotage and terrorist groups. Significant costs were required to strengthen railway tracks and construct various infrastructure facilities. The negative attitude of the population towards the movement of nuclear missile weapons through the states and the potential threats of environmental damage was revealed. In the interest of strengthening the secrecy regime, it was deemed impossible to use civilian specialists. Nevertheless, in the course of the negotiations, the Americans apparently convinced the Soviet side that a significant scientific and technical backbone had been created for the deployment of ELWs. However, the analysis of information materials of those years makes it possible to conclude that the production of even a prototype of the American FLIR and its full-scale tests were far from being completed. Thus, the only missile test launch from a railway launcher failed for technical reasons and was replaced by a drop test. Therefore, it is not possible to see a solution to the problem of diverting the jet stream from the launch wagon during the launch of the missile's marching engine after its release from the container. It was noted that the MX rocket was designed for a silo-based version, had not been modified and did not have the rocket's climbing engines after launch. This could result in a fire and the failure of the launch wagon and the railway track section. The determination of the composition, appearance and requirements for the facilities of the permanent basing points of the BZHRK and the railway infrastructure was stopped at the stage of conceptual design. There were no options for dispersal and combat patrolling with the use of an experienced BZHRK on the real railway network. It was not possible to develop highly accurate systems for the navigation of FLLCs and for the targeting of missiles when preparing launches from any suitable railway sections. There were no complex resource and transport tests of the BZHRK with the "MX" rocket with the withdrawal to the railways and the development of combat training tasks. The missile's behaviour under real shock and vibration conditions was not assessed. The problem of creating a centralized system to control the combat patrol of the LRBMs on the US railways, which were in the hands of private companies, was not solved. The combat railroad missile system had a significant number of disguising features. It was impossible to practically develop the forms and methods of combat use of FLIRVs, the ideology of their dispersion, the organization of combat duty and control of nuclear missile weapons on combat patrol routes, and the basics of their technical operation and comprehensive maintenance.

Not surprisingly, the main efforts of Washington were aimed at restricting the functioning and subsequent elimination of domestic FLWRs. To this end, the Americans achieved the inclusion in the texts of the START Treaty and its annexes of unilateral restrictive and liquidating articles and procedures, the implementation of which led to the destruction of our railway missile systems, although the Pentagon did not plan to deploy its own similar grouping. This is confirmed by the following. Thus, in accordance with article III, paragraph 10 (b), of the Treaty, the United States side declared the existing types of ICBMs for mobile launchers to be "MX" missiles (no TTHs were specified for the railway version of the missile), noting that the mobile version of the missile was not deployed. In accordance with Section II, paragraph 2. (b) and annex A of the "Memorandum of Understanding to establish baseline data in connection with the Treaty between the USSR and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms", the Americans submitted: Number of missiles and payloads of ELISAs - 0; their deployable weight - 0; non-deployed mobile launchers - only prototype; test launcher - 1; fixed structure for mobile launchers - none; transport and loading facilities - 1; non-deployed MX missile at the range - 1. Photos of the launch wagon and other means according to Annex J (by mutual exchange) were not presented. Thus, in reality, the American BZHRK existed mainly in the form of loud statements by US politicians. Neither were the objects of infrastructure of the assumed permanent deployment sites declared. During the inspections it turned out that the Americans did not think to start retrofitting the above-mentioned air bases in order to deploy their BLW. Obviously, they did not want to invest in waiting for the START Treaty to be signed.

After it became clear that the deployment of LGM-118A ICBM missiles would remain silo-based, it was decided to take measures for deep upgrading of electronic equipment and communication systems of command posts ("Rapid Execution And Combat Targeting" program - "accelerated execution of combat control and redirecting commands"). However, after the signing of the new START-2 treaty in January 1993, according to which "Peacekeeper" missiles were planned to be on duty as MIRV missiles by the end of 2004, these plans were redirected to the Minuteman-III ICBM (modernization was carried out from October 1994 to August 1996). By that time, the structure of the U.S. Air Force had changed - the SAC was disbanded in 1992, and all the ICBMs were transferred to the formed Space Command of the Air Force, all strategic missile wings were renamed into space wings, and strategic missile squadrons were renamed into missile squadrons with the number preserved. In addition, there was a reduction in the number of air bases with ICBMs - from 9 in 1982 to 3 in 1998. In June 2001, U.S. Defense Secretary D. Rumsfeld announced the withdrawal of LGM-118A ICBMs from service. Despite the fact that Russia considered itself not bound by the treaty on the reduction of ICBMs with RGCH IN due to the withdrawal of the U.S. from the ABM Treaty of 1972, the dismantling of LGM-118A missiles began in October 2002 with the rate of 1 missile in 17 days. The dismantled missiles were sent to Hill Air Base, Utah, for storage. By January 2003 on duty 46 missiles of 50, by January 2004 - 29. In the same year, a training and combat launch of this ICBM was held, which was the last. A total of 51 ICBMs were launched between 1983 and 2004 (18 of them under the test program), only one launch was completely unsuccessful, in 2001. The combat training launch, scheduled for August 2005, was cancelled. In total, 114 missiles were built. By January 2005, only 10 ICBMs remained on combat duty and the last one was removed from combat duty in September 2005, and the 400th rocket squadron of the 90th space wing was deactivated in October of the same year. Based on the elements of the removed from combat duty ICBM "Peacekeeper" and "Minuteman-II" developed conversion radars of the family "Minotaur" - "Minotaur-IV" and "Minotaur-II" respectively.

Looking at the Peacekeeper missile system as a whole, American engineers have managed to create a truly highly advanced new-generation ICBM, which, thanks to much higher accuracy of fire, has been able to destroy the most fortified strategic targets in the USSR. U.S. experts assessed the probability of destroying the 15A18 ICBM system by two hits of the Mk21 BB with the W87-0 BC (Peacekeeper ICBM) of 300 kt each as 0.962, while two Mk12As with 335 kt each destroyed the same mine with a probability of only 0.59 and two Mk12s with W62 (Minuteman-III) with 170 kt each destroyed the same mine with a probability of only 0.407. The missile had a fairly strong BMD ICBM, and the missile and its combat equipment had significantly increased resistance, compared to its predecessors, not only to NNFVs, but also to weapons based on new physical principles. The upgraded shafts provided the complex with increased resistance to foammable substances (first of all, to excess pressure in the shock front - up to 155 kgf/cm2 and to seismodynamic soil displacement). According to the calculations of American experts, the LGM-118A missile was 6-8 times more effective than the Minuteman-III missile. The development of this missile in the U.S. forced the USSR to start developing its analogue of this missile - RT-23 UTTH ICBM, which was put on duty in two versions - mobile railway and stationary mine, and was not inferior to the Peacekeeper ICBM in terms of combat efficiency. Nevertheless, despite all the advantages, the MX program as a whole can be assessed as having failed to accomplish a significant number of its tasks (although, in part, the Americans were able to "spin" the USSR at a huge cost associated with programs to build and deploy several new or upgraded types of ICBMs of different bases at once). Therefore, with the approaching expiration of the 20-year warranty period, the U.S. has abandoned further use of this ICBM (although, taking into account the experience gained with the Minuteman ICBM in extending its solid fuel warranty period and having a stock of missiles produced, the U.S. could have operated this missile in its arsenal for at least another 10 years). The choice was made to significantly enhance the capabilities of the Minuteman-III ICBM, including through technologies developed under the MX program.